After some reflection, I've been convinced that it's unlikely everybody reads
the manuals, or that the manuals are even correct or complete. So the new doas
behavior moving forward is to reset most everything to the target user's
Your action items, as we like to say in the biz, are:
1. Check existing configs for "restricted root" rules and verify that they are
run with the correct environment.
2. When updating, check for rules that intentionally use inherited environment
variables. They may need to be explicitly passing using setenv in doas.conf.
Damien Miller (djm@) has just committed a new feature for SSH that should help protect against all the various memory side channel attacks that have surfaced recently.
Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against speculation
and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer and
Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use
with a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey"
consisting of random data (currently 16KB).
I have been working on a nice feature that improves startup behaviour of
Summary: make sure you have at least one constraint source configured
and use no options. ntpd will set the clock if needed, even if you
machines has no battery backed up clock and is running a DNSSEC
And here is the commit message:
Import Kristaps Dzonsons' RPKI validator into the tree
rpki-client(1) is an implementation of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI), specified by RFC 6480. The client is responsible
for downloading, validating and converting Route Origin Authorisations
(ROAs) into Validated ROA Payloads (VRPs). The client's output (VRPs)
can be used by bgpd(8) to perform BGP Origin Validation (RFC 6811).
The current rpki-client(1) version depends on the CMS functions in
OpenSSL, this of course needs to be addressed urgently.
Thanks to NetNod, IIS.SE, SUNET & 6connect for supporting this effort!
On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 08:31:31AM -0600, Job Snijders wrote:
> CVSROOT: /cvs
> Module name: src
> Changes by: email@example.com 2019/06/17 08:31:31
> Log message:
> Vendor Tag: job
> Release Tags: job_20190617
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/LICENSE.md
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/Makefile
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/README.md
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/TODO.md
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/as.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/cert.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/cms.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/crl.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/extern.h
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/io.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/ip.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/log.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/main.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/mft.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/roa.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/rpki-client.1
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/rsync.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/tal.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/test-cert.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/test-ip.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/test-mft.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/test-roa.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/test-tal.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/compats.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/configure
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/tests.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/output-bgpd.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/validate.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/x509.c
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/tals/afrinic.tal
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/tals/apnic.tal
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/tals/lacnic.tal
> N src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/tals/ripe.tal
> No conflicts created by this import
Module name: src
Changes by: firstname.lastname@example.org 2019/06/07 02:07:52
usr.sbin/acme-client: acctproc.c acme-client.1 certproc.c
extern.h http.c http.h json.c main.c
Implement RFC 8555 "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)" to be able to talk to the v02 Let's Encrypt API.
With this acme-client(1) will no longer be able to talk to the v01
API. Users must change the api url in /etc/acme-client.conf to
Existing accounts (and certs of course) stay valid and after the url
change acme-client will be able to renew certs.
Tested by Renaud Allard and benno
Input & OK benno
The OpenBSD Foundation is excited to announce that it has received its
largest ever donation. Smartisan has topped
its own previous record donation with a 2019 donation of CDN$380,000.00.
This makes Smartisan the first Iridium level donor of 2019.
Smartisan has donated tickets sales from its new product launch events
to the open source community since 2014. This year Smartisan chose to
donate some of the proceeds to the OpenBSD Foundation.
We thank Smartisan for its very generous support! This donation
will allow the Foundation to fund many exciting initiatives in
OpenBSD and related projects over the next few years.
As we've noted before, this donation does not preclude others from contributing!
2019-06-10RELIABILITYSeveral issues were corrected in bgpd: "network" statements with no fixed prefix were incorrectly removed when configuration was reloaded, "export default-route" did not work, and "network 0.0.0.0/0" could not be used in some cases.