Contributed by rueda on from the key route announcement dept.
Sebastian Benoit (benno@)
announced
the release of
version 9.1
of
rpki-client, the essential component for routing security.
See the full announcement for further details.
Here are some key excerpts from the release announcement:
This release includes the following changes to the previous release: - Impose same-origin policy for RRDP This addresses an oversight in the original RRDP specification (RFC8182) which allowed any publication server to cause load on another server by tricking RPs into making cross-origin requests. Imposing a same-origin policy in RRDP client/server communication isolates resources such as Delta and Snapshot files from different Repository Servers, reducing possible attack vectors. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rrdp-same-origin - Introduce tiebreaking for trust anchors Instead of always using newly-retrieved trust anchors, compare a fetched TA with one stored in the cache. Later notBefore and earlier notAfter are used to identify a trust anchor certificate as newer. This prevents certain forms of replay attack. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker - Fix internal identification of CA resource certificates The rpki-client utility tracks CA certificates across privilege separation boundaries. The original design was to use the subject key identifier, which is problematic because the SKI is not guaranteed to be globally unique. On the one hand, operators could choose to reuse their keys for multiple CAs and on the other hand, publishing a CA cert in the RPKI requires no proof of possession: anyone can publish CA certificates with any public key they please. - Verify self-signage for trust anchors In other PKIs, trust anchors come from a trusted source and contain little to no important information apart from the public key. Therefore, libcrypto's chain verifier does not check their signatures by default because this "doesn't add any security and just wastes time". None of this is true in the RPKI and therefore trust anchors need an extra verification step. - Introduce a check for filenames as presented by publication points Filenames presented by publication points are unsigned data, they must match the location in the signed object's EE certificate SIA extension which is signed data. This prevents some forms of replay attack. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-manifest-numbers - Improved compliance with RFCs 6487 and 8209 for certificates and CRLs The issuer field of certificates and CRLs is checked to comply with section 4.4 of RFC 6487. Various aspects of URIs provided in SIA, AIA and CRL distribution points were improved. Criticality of key usage is now enforced and the extension is inspected for all certificate types. - Presence of CMS signing-time is now enforced and presence of CMS binary-signing-time is disallowed, per RFC 9589. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9589.html - Lowered the maximum acceptable manifest number to 2^159 - 1, per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-manifest-numbers - Limit number of validated ASPAs per customer ASID, per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile - Ignore the CRL Number extension in CRLs, per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-crl-numbers - Various minor bug fixes and improvements in logging and error reporting
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