Security fix for ipsec

Contributed by grey on 2004-12-15 from the quilting dept.

Thanks to cruel for submitting the following:

On systems running isakmpd(8) it is possible for a local user to cause kernel memory corruption and system panic by setting ipsec(4) credentials on a socket.

The patch may be downloaded here for 3.6 here for 3.5 and here for 3.4. As always, be sure to check http://www.openbsd.org/errata.html for any additional details.

(Comments are closed)

Comments

By Anonymous Coward (208.252.48.163) on 2004-12-15 17:40

Who committed the broken code?
Comments
1. By Michael Knudsen (82.150.71.100) on 2004-12-15 19:36
  
  It doesn't matter, but why don't you learn how to use CVS and find out for yourself?
  Comments
  1. By Anonymous Coward (64.119.174.202) on 2004-12-16 13:32
    
    Like hell it doesn't. Part of being secure is not just making band-aids for security holes, but being proactive and preventing them. That might mean having a discussion with someone on their coding practices or taking away access to someone who writes insecure code. Is this an operating system or a hobby? Exactly.
    
    Comments
    
    By Michael Knudsen (82.150.71.100) on 2004-12-16 22:02
    
    This is not the right place to deal with people writing bad code -- especially not when people are not giving their real name (or any name for that matter).
    
    Go away.
    
    Comments
    
    By RC (4.8.17.8) on 2004-12-16 22:36
    
    What? You don't believe his real name is "Anonymous Coward"?
    
    Comments
    
    By Anonymous Coward (24.34.57.27) on 2004-12-16 23:38
    
    Like "RC"?
By Hans-Joerg Hoexer (194.95.224.220) on 2004-12-15 20:10

Just a note: This was a problem with the PF_KEY socket implementation with regard to SADB_ACQUIRE messages. The only program in the tree actually using this particular facility is isakmpd(8). Thus this is a security fix for ipsec(4) (see message on security-announce), not isakmpd(8).
Comments
1. By grey (207.215.223.2) on 2004-12-16 00:10
  
  Thanks for the correction, I've updated the subject for the submission to reflect this.
By Anonymous Coward (201.252.36.47) on 2004-12-16 10:05

3.4 is suported or not???
Comments
1. By Brad (65.110.162.62) brad at comstyle dot com on 2004-12-16 14:47
  
  There will be no more 3.4 patches.
  Comments
  1. By Jason Crawford (65.174.217.58) jasonrcrawford@gmail.com on 2004-12-16 16:10 http://www.purebsd.net/
    
    Well, looking at the source-changes mailing list, I do see a commit to fix this with the 3.4 tag, here so it looks like 3.4 may not be dead quite yet?
    
    Comments
    
    By Michael Knudsen (82.150.71.100) on 2004-12-16 22:02
    
    Want to play it safe? Don't count on any more upgrades then.
    
    Comments
    
    By Brad (65.110.162.62) brad at comstyle dot com on 2004-12-20 16:55
    
    And that will be the last 3.4 -stable commit.

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